We present an analysis of advertising activities in a dynamic oligopoly with differentiated goods by differential game approach under general demand and cost functions. Mainly we show the following results. The comparison of the open-loop solution and that of the closed-loop solution depends on whether the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and the memoryless closed-loop solution and the feedback solution are equivalent when there is no spillover effect of advertising activities.
Introduction
inverse demand functions for all firms are symmetric. We assume ∂p i (A i (t), q 1 (t), q 2 (t), . . . , q n (t)) ∂q i (t) < 0, ∂p i (A i (t), q 1 (t), q 2 (t), . . ., q n (t)) ∂q j (t) < 0, j i, ∂p i (A i (t), q 1 (t), q 2 (t), . . ., q n (t)) ∂ A i (t) > 0, and
If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes ∂p j ∂q i (t) + ∂ 2 p j ∂q i (t)∂q j (t) q j (t) < 0, j i, and if they are strategic complements ∂p j ∂q i (t) + ∂ 2 p j ∂q i (t)∂q j (t) q j (t) > 0, j i.
The production cost of Firm i is
c(q i (t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}, c(q i (t)) > 0.
This is common to all firms. c(q i (t)) is strictly increasing and convex, that is, c ′ i (q i (t)) > 0 and c ′′ i (q i (t)) ≥ 0. Let k i (t) be the advertising investment by Firm i. The moving of A i (t) is governed by dA i (t) dt = Γ(k i (t), K −i (t)) − δA i (t), i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}, Γ(k i (t), K −i (t)) > 0,
where
δ > 0 is the constant depreciation rate. We assume that Γ(k i (t), K −i (t)) is strictly increasing and concave, that is,
The last condition means that the direct effect of advertising is larger than the spillover effect.
Γ is common to all firms. Denote Γ(k i (t), K −i (t)) by Γ i .
The advertising investment cost of Firm i is γ(k i (t)), i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}, γ(k i (t)) > 0.
We assume that it is strictly increasing and strictly convex, that is
γ is common to all firms. The instantaneous profit of Firm i is written as
The objective of Firm i is
subject to (2). ρ > 0 is the discount rate. The present value Hamiltonian function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}, is
The current value Hamiltonian function for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}, iŝ
µ ii (t) and µ i j (t) are the costate variables. DenoteĤ i (q i (t), k i (t)) byĤ i .
Advertising in dynamic oligopoly: Open-loop solution
We seek to the solution of the open-loop approach. The first order conditions for Firm i are
and
The second order condition about production is
The second order condition about advertising investment is
The adjoint conditions are
We have
At the steady state
By symmetry of the oligopoly we can assume
for j i, and so on. Denote the steady state values of q i (t), k i (t), A i (t), λ ii (t) and λ i j (t) by q * , k * ,A * , λ own and λ other . From (8) and (10) we have λ other = 0.
From (7) and (9)
(6) is reduced to
From (2) and (7), under the symmetry condition,
From (6) with λ i j (t) = 0 and
, under the symmetry condition,
. Thus, we have
.
Consider a system of dynamic equations (13) and (14). Linearization of them around the steady state is as follows.
The Jacobian matrix Ω has the following trace and determinant
For the steady state to be a saddle point we need
det Ω < 0.
If det Ω > 0, the steady state is unstable. From
Let Φ be the left-hand side of (12). Differentiating Φ with respect to A i (t) at the steady state yields
From the assumptions (3) and (4)
Therefore, det Ω < 0 means ∂Φ ∂ A i (t) < 0, and we have shown the following result.
Lemma 1. The left-hand side of (12), Φ, is decreasing with respect to A i (t).

Linear and quadratic example
Assume that the inverse demand function is
The advertising cost is
The production cost is c(q i (t)) = cq i (t), and the accumulation of advertising effects is written as
At the steady state, (5) is reduced to
Thus,
From (11)
Solving (15) and (16) yields
,
These are the results in Cellini and Lambertini (2003b) .
Advertising in a dynamic oligopoly: Memoryless closed-loop solution without spillover
We seek to the solution of the memoryless closed-loop approach. As discussed in Introduction memoryless closed-loop and open-loop are not equivalent. For simplicity, we assume
that is, there is no spillover effect of advertising investment. The first order conditions and the second order conditions for Firm i are the same as those in the open-loop case. Using (17), they are
The adjoint conditions are different from those in the open-loop case. They are
The terms in (20)
and the terms in (21)
take into account the interaction between the control variables of the firms other than Firm i and the current levels of the state variables. We have
is obtained by (43) in Appendix. If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes
∂ A i (t) > 0, and if they are strategic complements
At the steady state we have
By symmetry of the oligopoly we can assume λ ii (t) = λ j j (t) for j i, λ i j (t) = λ il (t) = λ ji (t) for j, l i,
, q j (t) = q i (t) for j i, and so on. Denote the steady state values of λ ii , λ i j , A i (t), q i (t) and k i (t) by λ own , λ other , A * * , q * * and k * * . Then, with (22) and (23), (20) is rewritten as
The first order condition for the choice of k i (t), (19), is reduced to
From (24) this means
From (2) and (20 with (22), (23)) we obtain
Under the assumption
∂K −i (t) = 0, for the steady state to be a saddle point we need
We assume det Ω ′ < 0. This system of dynamics are obtained from (26) and (27). The first order condition for the output choice in the memoryless closed-loop case, (18), is the same as that, (5), in the open-loop case. Thus, we have q * * = q * given the value of A i (t).
We show the following proposition. (25) with (12) in the open-loop case. Suppose that A * = A * * . Then, q * = q * * , k * = k * * . They satisfy (25), and the left-hand side of (12), which is denoted by Φ, is negative because 2. If the outputs of the firms are strategic complements,
∂ A i (t) < 0, and the left-hand side of (12) is positive. Therefore, the steady state value of A i (t) in the closed-loop solution is smaller than that in the open-loop solution.
Advertising in a dynamic oligopoly: Feedback solution without spillover
We consider a solution of feedback approach using the HJB equation. Similarly to the previous section we assume
Let V i (A 1 (t), A 2 (t), . . . , A n (t)) be the value function of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., n}. The HJB equation for Firm i is written as
The first order conditions are
(29) is the same as (18) in the memoryless closed-loop case. From (30)
Substituting this into (28), using symmetry, yields
This is an identity. Differentiating it with respect to A i (t) yields
At the steady state Γ i − δA i (t) = Γ j − δA j (t) = 0. Thus, using (29), we get
From this and (31),
This is the same as (25). Therefore, Proposition 2. If there is no spillover effect of the advertising investment, the memoryless closed-loop solution and the feedback solution are equivalent.
Cartel
We consider full cartelization in which the firms cooperatively determine their outputs and advertising investments to maximize the discounted total profits. By symmetry we assume
Denote the values of them by p(t), q(t), k(t), A(t). The objective of the firms is max
LetĤ be the current value Hamiltonian function, then
Let µ(t) = e −ρt λ(t).
µ(t) is the costate variable. Denote p(A(t), q(t), . . ., q(t)) by p. The first order conditions are
The adjoint condition is
Denote the steady state values of A(t), λ(t), q(t) and k(t) by A c , λ c , q c and k c . From (35)
Then, from (34) we have
We show the following proposition. (5) is
Therefore, under the second order condition for the output choice in the open-loop case, the output of each firm in the open-loop solution is larger than that in the cartel, or the output of each firm in the cartel is smaller than that in the open-loop solution, that is, q c < q * given A(t) .
Assume
Suppose that A(t) and q c , which is obtained from (33) with A(t), satisfy (37). Then, the left-hand side of (12) in the open-loop case, which is denoted by Φ, is negative because by (1) ∂p i ∂ A(t) q i (t) is deceasing with respect to q i (t) and q * > q c . Since Φ is decreasing with respect to A i (t), the value of A i (t) in the open-loop solution is larger than the value of A(t) in the cartel, or the value of A(t) in the cartel is smaller than the value of A i (t) in the open-loop solution.
If there is spillover effect of advertising activities, the value of A(t) in the cartel may be larger than A i (t) in the open-loop solution.
Linear and quadratic example
At the steady state (33) and (34) are reduced to
From (35) with
From (38)
From
Solving (39), (40), (41) and (42),
In Cellini and Lambertini (2003b) the current value Hamiltonian function in (32) is written as follows.
Then, we obtain
Concluding Remark
We have studied the problem of advertising activities in a dynamic oligopoly under general demand and cost functions by a differential game approach. We have shown that the results in Cellini and Lambertini (2003b) in a case of linear demand and quadratic cost functions can be generalized to a case of general demand and cost functions, but some results depend on the property of demand functions, strategic substitutability or strategic complementartity.
Appendix: Derivation of ∂q j (t)
∂A i (t) .
Suppose a state such that q 1 (t) = q 2 (t) = · · · = q n (t). Denote p i (A i (t), q 1 (t), q 1 (t), . . ., q n (t)) by p i . 
where ∆ = 2 ∂p i ∂q i (t) + ∂ 2 p i ∂q i (t) 2 q i (t) − c ′′ (q i (t)) n ∂p j ∂q j (t) + (n − 1) ∂ 2 p j ∂q j (t) 2 q j (t) − c ′′ (q j (t)) − (n − 1) ∂p i ∂q j (t) + ∂ 2 p i ∂q i (t)∂q j (t) q i (t) ∂p j ∂q i (t) + ∂ 2 p j ∂q i (t)∂q j (t) q j (t) > 0.
If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes ∂p j ∂q i (t) + ∂ 2 p j ∂q i (t)∂q j (t) q j (t) < 0 ,
∂ A i (t) < 0, and if they are strategic complements 
